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中文摘要：
股权激励被广泛视为公司解决委托代理问题的一种有效手段，然而，股权激励契约中存在的诸如期限过短、业绩指标单一、业绩制定条件形式化等影响激励效果的问题，却很少受到学者关注。本文从激励契约结构角度出发，以股权激励契约要素为研究对象，择取沪深A股上市公司的相关数据，对股权激励契约要素及其影响因素进行实证分析。研究发现：激励期限越长、业绩条件越严格的股权激励契约的激励效果越好；董事会规模和独立董事可以在一定程度上约束业绩条件的严格制定；较之于民营企业，国有企业倾向于选择较长的激励期限；股权集中度和债务融资水平高的企业，倾向于选择严格的绩效条件。本文的研究补充了股权激励契约结构特征的相关文献，为上市公司提高股权激励方案的质量，规范与完善股权激励相关制度提供了经验证据。
英文摘要：
Equity incentive is widely viewed as one of the effective means to solve the principal-agent problem. However, incentive contract has many problems; such as too short incentive period, a single performance indicator and exercising condition only designed formately and low quality; rarely arouse the attention of scholars. This paper, from the perspective of the incentive contract structure, uses equity incentive contracts elements as the object of study, selects related data of the listed companies, and empirically analyzes the equity incentive contracts elements and factors which influence them. The results show that： equity incentive program has a better incentive effect when incentive period longer or performance condition strict; state-owned enterprise choose a longer incentive period; Board of directors, independent directors, can constrain the formulation of exercising condition to a certain degree, ownership concentration and level of debt have a positive significant relationship with exercising condition. This study complement the related re search of equity incentive contract structure characteristics, providing the reference to improve the quality of the equity incentive scheme and standardize the equity incentive system for listed companies.
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