矿产资源型国有企业作为中国对外直接投资的重要排头兵,为确保中国资源需求和安全做出了重要贡献,但也暴露出很多问题。本文基于对矿产资源型国有企业对外直接投资特征的分析,提出三种形式的套利动机,并基于实物期权理论.构建套利动机推动下的投资决策模型。结果表明:由于套利动机的存在,即使项目未来潜在的经济价值小于投资成本,投资也有可能发生。尤其是当套利独立于项目价值成为决策层私利的时候.这一问题将更加突出。同时。即使项目投资还不成熟。三种套利的存在都会加速投资。在制度套利推动下,国有企业会利用海外监管缺位和补贴优惠等来加速海外布局.由此可能造成投资区域过度集中:在期限套利推动下.国有企业可能为关注资产投机而降低对项目本身的关注。会在研判能力不足的情况下出现投资冲动.由此可能造成资金投向非实体领域形成资源错配;在市场套利推动下,国有企业短时间内会出现海外集中“抄底”现象.加大了对外直接投资的风险,由此可能形成海外企业自相竞争而“渔翁得利”局面。
As the important pioneers of Chinese outward FDI, state-owned mineral enterprises have made great contributions to resource demand and security. But they also expose many problems. Three arbitrage motivations were put forward based on the characteristics of outward FDI from Chinese state-owned mineral enterprises, and based on the real option theory, the model of investment decision containing the motivations was built. The results show that as the result of arbitrage motivations, enterprises will invest even if potential value of the project is less than the cost. Especially when arbitrage is independent of the project value, which becomes decision-makers' gain, this problem will become more prominent. And institutional arbitrage, term arbitrage, and market arbitrage will make investment in advanced even if the investment is not yet mature. Promoted by institutional arbitrage, state-owned mineral enterprises make use of supervisor vacancy abroad and subsidies to accelerate the overseas layout, which may cause excessive concentration in investment areas. Pushed by term arbitrage, enterprises may more focus on asset speculation than the project itself, which makes decision makers invest impulsively when dynamic analysis is insufficient and this may cause capital far away from the real economy and form resources mismatch. Driven by market arbitrage, state-owned mineral enterprises will focus on overseas bargain hunting in a short run, which will increase the risk of outward FDI, and this may cause the domestic enterprises competition with each other and foreign enterprises gain the benefit.