中文摘要：

构建煤、电企业间的交易发展模型,分析中国煤电交易的稳定匹配的作用机理和规模联动的动态过程。首先,界定＂煤电交易＂的属性和治理结构;其次,优化延迟选择和拒绝机制,形成适合于煤电交易的匹配算法;再次,为偏好排序构建得分数、潜在收益、意愿信任和弹性模型,利用自适应系统进行边界选择;最后,通过模拟仿真,验证理论假设、算法可行性和模型有效性。结果表明：（1）效率可保证企业的有效供给和产出,信任的地位应仅次于收益;（2）当发电企业对煤电企业的打分高于自身的得分数时,发电企业会倾向于＂购买＂煤炭;（3）控制和调整煤炭产业规模方面,既应合理适度地淘汰产能落后的现役煤炭企业,又应通过发电企业设置必要的市场准入壁垒。

英文摘要：

In China′s coal consumption structure,there are more than 33% of industrial coal used for thermal power generation.Coal transaction is not only related to China′s economic growth and energy security,but also related to China′s low carbon commitments and other climate issues.The existing researches have neglected an important research unit,Transaction,which results in the weak feasibility of the research conclusion and the insufficient implementation of the policy recommendations.By using the theory of transaction cost economics,the technology of agent-based computational economics and the algorithm of two-sided matching,a transaction development model between power and coal is built to analyze the mechanism of stable matches and the dynamic process of scale linkage.First,the property and the governance structure of ＂coal transaction＂ are defined theoretically.Second,the deferred choice and refusal algorithm are optimized to design a mechanism suitable for coal transaction with respect to matching.Third,score,potential profitability,intentional trust and elasticity are illustrated for sorting preferences,and Complex Adaptive System is used for boundary selection.Finally,through simulation,we verify the theoretical assumptions,the feasibility of our algorithm and the plausibility of our model are verified.The results show that：（1）Efficiency ensures the efficient supply and output of enterprises,trust′role is next to profit in the choice of partners.（2）When the coal enterprise′s score is higher than the power enterprise′s,power enterprise will tend to buy coal instead of make it;（3）to control and adjust the scale of coal industry,China should reasonably and moderately eliminate the coal enterprises with backward production capacity,and set some necessary barriers to market access through the power enterprises.The data in our paper is used for the simulation.The source of the initial value of our data is the China Electric Power Enterprises Association and the National Bureau of Statisti