中文摘要：

以最优监督框架为基础,引入随机监督机制,并构建理论模型,研究了银行对中小企业的最优随机监督强度问题。研究结果表明：对于银行方来说,较高强度的监督,看似可以减少评估中的不确定性行为,但实际上会影响对企业进行甄别和筛选的有效性;引入随机监督机制可使企业显露出其本来类型,有利于银行对企业的甄别与筛选;引入随机监督机制,并采取最优随机监督策略,有利于银行更好地维护自身利益。最后,对以上结论进行了数值模拟和理论解释,并提出相应的建议。

英文摘要：

This paper introduces random monitoring mechanism in optimal monitor frame and constructs a model to study the optimal monitoring intensity in relationship financing between bank and medium and small sized enterprises.Our analysis first suggests that reducing uncertainty in evaluation may not improve screen efficiency in relationship financing,and in fact,can have the opposite effect.Second,introducing random monitoring in a relationship financing could induce bad entrepreneurs to reveal their intrinsic types and this is helpful to screening.Furthermore,adoption of the optimal random monitoring in relationship finance is favorable to the bank＇s gains.At last,we use numerical simulation to show these conclusions and offer the explanations and strategies.