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中文摘要：
以控股股东的不同控制权利益动机为切入点，考察了公司成长期权对控股股东投资时机的影响及其差异，进而对公司价值产生的影响，并解释其内在机理．研究结论表明，成长期权对控股股东投资时机决策的影响会随着控股股东所持利益动机的不同而存在差异．以成本补偿为动机的控股股东，其投资时机与公司目标较为接近，偏离程度远小于在利益侵占动机的驱使下的偏离程度．公司所拥有的成长期权对控股股东修正延迟投资行为具有激励作用，但是这种激励作用在控股股东持成本补偿动机时更为明显．另外，这种激励作用随着成长因子的增大和控股股东所占股份的增多而更加明显．
英文摘要：
Under the background of different benefits motives of controlling shareholder, this paper study how and why the growth options of corporation affect controlling shareholders＇ investment timing decision. The re- sults indicated that effect of growth options on controlling shareholders vary with different benefits motives. Controlling shareholder with benefits tunnelling motive is easy to complicated with more serious delay deferring investment problems, comparable to that cotrolling shareholder with cost compensation motive makes the in- vestment timing decision which is more close to corporation aim. Second, growth options of corporation has in- centive effect on the controlling shareholders＇ deferring investment problems, but the effects is different with vary benefits motivation. Specific as follow： incentive effect of controlling shareholder with cost compenstation movtive is significantly better than controlling shareholder with benefits tunneling motive. Furthmore, the effect of growth option increases with bigger growth factor or more shares of contolling shareholder.
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Financial relationships, banking structure and financing constraints: evidence from private enterpri
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