基于终极股东自利动机与资本投向选择差异的理论阐释,实证考察了终极控制下的资本投向结构分布及其对总体投资绩效的影响.研究发现:1)终极股东的现金流权越低,越有增加固定资产、无形资产和股权并购的资本投入,以及削减R&D投资的动机;2)随着现金流权的降低,地方企业集团的固定资产投资规模和增速增大,地方资产公司的股权投资增长趋势更为强劲,这与两类地方国有终极股东的运营模式和谋利能力密切相关;3)由于获取特许和垄断性使用权的难度较大,民营终极股东自利动机对无形资产投资的影响不显著;4)终极股东自利动机下的投资选择,不仅降低了整体的资本配置绩效,而且导致投资结构的异化.上述研究结论,对于从产权角度来理解中国经济高速增长背后的微观投资的非效率成因具有重要意义,也为进一步改善技术创新投资的产权激励机制提供了理论依据.
Based on the theory of uhimate shareholders' self-interest motivation and the selection difference o- ver capital allocations, this paper empirically studies the capital allocation structure and its influence on the o- verall investment performance in the situation of ultimate control. Here are the conclusions : ( 1 ) The lower the cash flow right of ultimate shareholders has, the bigger their motivation to increase investment on fixed asset, intangible asset, equity merge and cut R&D investment will be; (2) With the lowering of the fight of cash flow, the fix asset investment scale and speed of local enterprise groups increase, and the equity investment of local asset enterprises have a stronger growth trend, which is closely related to the operation model and profit capability of the two kinds of local state ultimate shareholders ; ( 3 ) Since it is too difficult to obtain privilege and monopoly right, the impact of private ultimate shareholders' self-interest motivation on intangible assets investment is not obvious;(4)Under the ultimate shareholders' self-interest motivation, the investment choices not only reduce the over-all capital allocation performance, but also lead to the dissimilation of the capital in- vestment structure. These findings are very valuable in understanding the reason of inefficiency on microcosmic investment behind the high growth of Chinese economy from the property right angle, and provide evidence for improving the property right inspiring system of innovative technique investment theoretically and empirically.