中文摘要：

从农产品质量安全具有市场需求效应的视角，通过引入合作社农户与龙头企业的努力水平以及努力成本因素，基于博弈理论和优化模型，比较分析了合作社与龙头企业一体化模式和龙头企业为主导的分散模式中的最优价格、利润和努力水平决策。研究认为，在龙头企业主导的分散模式中，龙头企业通过为合作社农户提供安全生产等努力成本补贴的协调策略，可以提高合作社与龙头企业的努力水平和利润，保障农产品质量安全，改善消费者福利。文章还分析了该补贴策略的影响因素及补贴策略下的最优决策，为实现合作社与龙头企业、消费者多赢的目标提供了参考。

英文摘要：

From the perspective of market demand for quality safety of agricultural products, this paper introduces the factors including the efforts and the relative costs of farmers and leading enterprises, and analyzes comparatively the optimal prices, opti- mal profits and optimal efforts in the integrative mode of cooperatives and leading enterprises and in the dispersive mode of leading enterprises based on game theory and optimal models. The research shows that in the dispersive mode dominated by leading enter- prises, leading enterprises use the coordinated strategy by providing the subsidies for farmers＇ effort cost in the safety producing, which can increase the effort level and the profit of cooperatives and leading enterprises, ensure the quality safety of agricultural products, and improve the consumer welfare. Moreover, it analyzes the influential factors of the subsidy strategy and the optimal decision under the strategy, to provide the reference to the realization of all-win goal of cooperatives, leading enterprises and con- sumers.