中文摘要：

针对我国进口食品安全问题突显现状,建立进口食品直接供求主体,即经销企业与消费者的博 弈模型,分析企业经销进口食品的不合格率与消费者对进口食品监督维权概率的均衡策略及其影响因 素,并且通过选取2010-2014年我国四类大宗进口食品的面板数据建立计量经济模型,实证分析进口 食品不合格率的监管、消费等影响因素.主要结论表明：进口食品量、食品消费支出对进口食品不合格 率具有负向影响,食品安全监管水平对进口食品不合格率具有正向影响.据此,从进口食品监管和消费 者监督维权角度,为保障我国进口食品安全提供相应的政策启示.

英文摘要：

Focusing on the present situation of the imported food safety problems in China, a game model is built on imported food distribution enterprise and the consumer to analyze the equilibrium strategy and its influential factors of the fraction defective with which the enterprise distributes the substandard imported food and the consumer supervises and safeguards the right for the imported food, and the econometric model is built by the panel data of the staple imported food between years 2010 and 2014 to make an empirical analysis on the influential factors of the imported food fraction defective including the supervision facet and the consumption facet. The main conclusions show that the quantities of the imported food and the food consumption expenditure have negative effect on the imported food fraction defective, and the food safety supervision level has positive effect on the imported food fraction defective. Accordingly, the corresponding policy implications are provided in order to guarantee the imported food safety in China from the supervision of the imported food and the consumers, supervision and rights.