在供应商向存在资金约束的销售商提供赊销的背景下,分别探讨丫批发价格契约和收入共享契约对二级供应链的协调问题.研究发现,批发价格契约无法协调存在赊销的供应链,当销售商的初始资金满足一定条件时,赊销背景下的收入共享契约能够实现存在资金约束供应链的自愿协调.收入共享契约下,共享比例随销售商初始资金的增大而增大,批发价格则随之增大而减小.最后通过数值算例对结论进行了验证.
Under the assumption of trade credit in a supply chain with one supplier and one capital-constrained retailer, two coordination mechanisms are studied, including wholesale price contract and revenue-sharing contract. It is shown that, using trade credit and wholesale price contract fails to coordinate the supply chain. However, under certain condition of retailer's initial capital, the revenue-sharing based on trade credit can fully coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocates the supply chain's profit. The relationship between parameters for revenue sharing contract is analyzed. The revenue sharing ratio increases with the initial capital, and the wholesale price decreases with the initial capital. Finally, a numerical example demonstrates the conclusion.