中文摘要：

二级供应链中的供应商和销售商均有私人信息,此时无法区分谁是供应链的核心企业,谁能主导供应链利润的分配。为解决该问题,运用委托代理理论,引入虚拟第三方作为利他的委托人,研究双边不对称信息下供应链双向激励和利润分配问题。结果表明,虚拟第三方对地位相当的交易双方实施双向激励后,得到其参与供应链的预期收益要求,该预期收益之和可能不等于甚至突破供应链整体期望收益。基于此,进一步应用纳什谈判解方法,获得双边不对称信息下供应链总收益的合理分配方案,此时供应链系统达到帕累托最优。通过数值分析验证了结果的有效性。

英文摘要：

Both suppliers and retailers in a two-echelon supply chain had their own private information,and the core enterprise of supply chain as well as leading allocation of supply chain＇s profit was difficult to distinguish.To solve this problem,through introduction of a virtual third-party as a selfless principal,double incentives and profit distribution of supply chain with asymmetric information were proposed based on principal agent theory.Main results revealed that the expected gain requirements of supplier and retailer were obtained when double incentives was carried out with the virtual third-party on behalf of the supply chain.Furthermore,the sum total of all participants＇ expected revenue might be not equal or even more than the expected revenue of the whole supply chain.Based on that,reasonable distribution of the supply chain＇s revenue was obtained by the virtual third-party with Nash bargaining solution,and the Pareto optimal allocation plan of the supply chain＇s profit was obtained.A numerical analysis was given to verify the validity of the results.