中文摘要：

全要素生产率是衡量企业要素转化能力的基础性指标,能反映公司治理效率和经营管理水平的变化,有关终极控制股东的治理因素与其存在一定的内在联系。建立平衡面板数据模型,使用2003年～2007年中国制造业上市公司的实证数据,研究终极控制权、终极控制权与现金流权分离程度、终极控制股东类型对公司全要素生产率的影响。研究结果显示,终极控制权在低水平时与公司全要素生产率正相关,产出增长效应占优;在高水平时与其负相关,产出替代效应占优,两者呈倒U型曲线关系。当产出增长效应向产出替代效应转化时,政府控制的公司转化的临界值最高、其他类型的次之、自然人或家族的最低。终极控制权与现金流权的分离程度、政府终极控制股东对公司全要素生产率均有显著负向影响。建议完善公司治理机制,提高终极控制链的信息披露质量,对终极控制股东形成有效监管,加强产出增长效应,弱化产出替代效应,以提升公司的全要素生产率。

英文摘要：

Total factor productivity is a basic indicator to measure the ability of factor transformation of companies, which can reflect the changes of corporate governance efficiency and level of managerial expertise. Hence, the governance factors of the ultimate controlling shareholders have a certain degree of inherent relations with it. We establish a balanced panel data model and use the empirical data of Chinese listed manufacturing companies from 2003 to 2007 to study the influence of ultimate control fight and cash flow fight on firm＇s total factor productivity. The results of estimation show that the ultimate control right is positively related to firm＇s total factor productivity in a low level and the output growth effect is dominant. However, it is negatively related to firm＇s total factor productivity in a high level and the output substitution effect is dominant. An inverse U-curve relationship exists between ultimate control fight and firm＇s total factor productivity. While the output growth effect converts to the output substitution effect, the converting threshold of companies controlled by government is the highest. The threshold is the lowest when companies are controlled by nature person or family. Companies have the median threshold when their ultimate controlling shareholders are other types. Moreover, the separation between ultimate control right and cash flow fight is negatively related to firm＇s total factor productivity. If the ultimate controlling shareholder is government, it also will have negative impact on firm＇s total factor productivity significantly. The mechanism of corporate governance and the quality of the information disclosure of ultimate control chains should be improved so as to monitor the ultimate controlling shareholder effectively. The firm＇s productivity should be increased by enhancing the output growth effect and weakening the output substitution effect.