中文摘要：

采用演化博弈方法对农村“三权”抵押融资中地方政府与金融机构的合作机制进行建模，探索了政府的激励政策与约束政策对金融机构积极支农的影响效应，并进行了数值模拟。研究发现：政府的激励与约束政策是影响金融机构支农和政府公共目标实现的决定因素。在实现政府公共目标的初期，约束政策较激励政策更有效；随着政府公共目标的逐步实现，激励政策将发挥更大效用。

英文摘要：

This paper analyzes the government policies and the agriculture-assistance behavior of rural fi- nancial institutions based on evolutionary game theory. It explores the effect of government＇s incentive policies and constraint policies on the financial institutions＇ enthusiasm to support farmers, and makes a numerical simulation. Study finds that： government＇s incentive and constraint policies are the decisive factors affecting agriculture-assistance and the government＇s public target. The constraint policies are more effective than the incentive ones during the initial stage of government targets. The incentive poli- cies play more important role in later stages of government targets. Finally＇ the paper puts forward some policy suggestions on the rural financial institutions.