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中文摘要：
应用有限理性及不完全信息下演化博弈原理,分析了基于品牌价值提升的产学研合作各方博弈主体的收益情况及产学研合作策略渐进稳定的过程。研究结果表明：在现实条件下,政府对产学研合作的有效激励是企业与高校及研究机构的博弈趋向于合作均衡状态收敛的主要诱因,激励力度越大,各方机会损失越小,向合作均衡收敛的可能性越大。
英文摘要：
Using the evolutionary game theory under the hypothesis of the ＂limited rationality＂ and the incomplete informa- tion in this paper, it investigated the earnings of the cooperated parties and the process of cooperative evolution to the stable strategy based on brand value enhancement. Under the eondition of reality, the main causality for the game among coopera- ted parties to evolve to cooperative equilibrium is the effective incentive came from the government. In addition, the more the incentive and the less the ooportunity loss is, the bigger the possibility of cooperative equilibrium will be.
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Research on the Differences of the Leading Industries’ Development and Energy Consumption Among Chin
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