针对旅游市场存在的严重宰客现象,探讨如何健全旅游市场监管机制问题.通过构建“旅游企业一游客一政府”三者之间的演化博弈模型,分析了影响各博弈主体策略选择与演化的因素,经模型求解确立各方行为策略趋于稳定状态的条件.研究表明,任何一方主体行为的演化趋势都与其他两方的策略选择密切相关;降低游客举报投诉成本、加大宰客旅游企业的处罚力度,同时降低政府监管成本、增加政府监管收益、提高政府成功查处宰客旅游企业的概率,是有效构建旅游市场监管机制的关键.
In order to solve the problem of tourist defrauding, this paper studies how to improve the supervi- sion mechanism of the tourism market. An evolutionary game model among tourism enterprises, tourists, and governments is established. The factors affecting the choice and evolution of the strategies of participants are analyzed. The conditions promoting the strategies of participators to stable state are given by model solving. The results show that the evolutionary trend of behaviors of any one of the participators is closely related to the strategies of other two participators. It has an important significance on promoting the formation of an effective supervision mechanism of tourism market to reduce the cost of report and complaint of tourists and increase the punishment of tourism enterprises who rip off tourists. At the same time, it is also significant to reduce the cost of supervision of governments and increase the income and probability of successfully investigating and prosecuting tourism enterprises who rip off tourists of governments.