中文摘要：

从行为博弈的角度出发，建立了基于“适时惩罚”与“适度惩罚”的企业员工越轨行为惩罚机制的一般数学模型，涉及到惩罚时点、惩罚强度和惩罚成本等多个变量指标的测度与优化，为企业员工越轨行为惩罚机制的设计和评价提供了一个基础性的理论框架，能够为企业管理相关领域的研究和实践提供定量分析与统计观测的新方法。

英文摘要：

From the perspective of behavior game, this paper has established a general mathematical model of enterprise employees＇deviance based on timely punishment and proper punishment. This model involves the measurement and optimization of multiple variable indexes, such as the time point of punishment, the intensity of punishment and punishment cost, which offers a fundamental theoretical framework for the design and assessment of enterprise employee deviance punishment mechanism. It can also offer a new way of quantitative analysis and statistical observation for the research and practice in related fields of business management.