中文摘要：

本文结合中国制度背景，从代理成本和信息不对称的视角理论推演终极控制股东与会计稳健性之间的关系。采用2004～2012年间在沪、深上市的1324家非金融公司组成的非平衡面板数据（总共8043个观察值），运用修正后的Basu（1997）模型实证检验终极控制股东如何影响会计稳健性。研究结果表明：（1）终极控制股东的现金流量权与会计稳健性正相关；（2）终极控制股东控制权和现金流量权的分离度与会计稳健性负相关；（3）与终极控制股东为非国有的公司相比，终极控制股东为国有的公司会计稳健性更强。

英文摘要：

Integrating institutional background of China, the paper theoretically deduced the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholders and accounting conservatism from perspective of agency cost and Information asymmetry. It adopted a sample of unbalanced panel data （8043 observations in total） composed of 1324 Chinese non-financial listed companies dated from 2004 to 2012, and applied adjusted Basu （1997） model to empirically investigate how ultimate controlling shareholders affects accounting conservatism. The results show that： （1） Cash flow right of ultimate controlling shareholders is positively related to accounting conservatism; （2） The divergence between ultimate controlling shareholder＇s control rights and cash flow rights is negatively correlated with accounting conservatism; （3） Compared with those companies whose ultimate controlling shareholder is non-state owned enterprises, companies whose ultimate controllin~ shareholder is state owned entemrises hold stronger accounting, conservatism.