中文摘要：

采用总债务占总资产比重,银行借款占总资产比重和商业信用占总资产比重度量融资结构,使用中国非金融上市公司截面数据,应用一系列OLS实证检验终极控制股东,法律环境与融资结构选择之间关系.研究发现：商业信用水平不受终极控制股东和法律环境的影响;现金流量权和控制权分离度低的公司具有显著高的总债务水平和银行借款;终极控制股东是国有公司者,其总债务水平和银行借款显著低于终极控制股东是民营等非国有公司者;法律环境好的地区的上市公司具有显著低的总债务水平和银行借款;终极控制股东与融资结构选择之间关系受法律环境的影响.

英文摘要：

The paper adopts the ratios of total debt to total assets, bank loan to total assets and trade credit to total assets to measure financing structure, uses the cross-section data of non-financial listed companies in Chi- na and applies a series of OLS to empirically test the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholders, le- gal environment and the choice of financing structure. The results show that： the level of trade credit is not af- fected by the ultimate controlling shareholder or the legal environment; the firms with low degree of divergence between cash flow and control right have remarkably higher levels of total debt and bank loans ; the firms whose ultimate controlling shareholders are state-owned enterprises have remarkably lower levels of total debt and bank loans than those firms whose ultimate controlling shareholders are non-state owned enterprises like private companies; the firms located in areas with excellent legal environment have remarkably lower levels of total debt and bank loan; the relationship between the ultimate controlling shareholder and the choice of financing structure is affected by legal environments.