中文摘要：

物流金融创新模式下的存货质押融资业务能有效解决供应链上的资金瓶颈，具有很大发展空间，但风险控制水平的滞后严重制约了业务的成长．本文针对基于统一授信的物流金融创新模式中季节性存货质押融资业务的核心风险控制指标——质押率展开研究，首先考虑统一授信模式的特征及成本收益结构，借鉴贸易融资中“主体＋债项”的风险评估思路，构建融资约束下的报童模型，分析风险中性的借款企业的再订购决策；进而，通过借款企业和物流企业的Stackelberg动态博弈，分析下侧风险规避的物流企业的质押率决策．研究表明，在统一授信模式下，下侧风险规避的物流企业必须针对不同借款企业的再订购决策反应设定相应质押率才能使决策最优，而且针对初始质押存货不同的借款企业，贷款下侧风险的限制对物流企业最优质押率决策会造成不同程度的影响．

英文摘要：

Inventory pledge financing in the innovative mode of logistics finance can effectively solve capital bottleneck in the supply chain and has a lot scope to develop. However, it is seriously constrained by the level of risk control. This paper focuses on loan-to-value ratios, i.e. the core indicator of risk in seasonal inventory financing in the uniform credit mode. Based on the features of this mode and the relevant cost-benefit structure, we build a newsvendor model with financial constraints and analyze reordering decisions made by riskneutral borrowers. Then, based on a dynamic Stackelberg game between borrowers and logistics enterprises, we investigate loan-to-value ratio decisions of downside-risk-adverse logistics enterprises. The results show that in uniform credit mode, downside-risk-averse logistics enterprises should set loan-to-value ratios according to different borrowers＇ reordering plans and then make their optimal decisions. Moreover, for the borrowers with different initial inventory, downside-risk limits affect the optimal decision of logistics enterprises differently.