中文摘要：

本文以货币政策波动为切入点，通过研究有、无政治关系的民营上市公司银行贷款与商业信用的互动关系，发现了两类公司不同的商业信用策略。（1）无政治关系的民营上市公司，在货币政策宽松时，表现为商业信用提供方，符合经营性动机理论；在货币政策紧缩期，表现为商业信用获得方，符合替代性融资理论。（2）有政治关系民营上市公司，无论是在货币政策宽松期还是紧缩期，都是商业信用的获得者，但是在宽松期获得的商业信用要远远大于紧缩期。进一步分析发现，在货币政策宽松期，政治关系与商业信用正相关；而在货币政策紧缩期，政治关系与商业信用负相关。（3）政治关系带来的贷款效应和竞争优势造成了两类公司商业信用策略的差异。

英文摘要：

Based on the monetary policy fluctuation as the breakthrough point, by studying how political connections affect the interaction between bank loans and commercial credit of private listed companies, we found that the two types companies have different commercial credit strategies. （ 1 ） Private listed com- panies with non-political connections, during the monetary policy easing phase, as commercial credit pro- viders, meet the operational theory of motivation, but in the period of monetary policy tightening, as com- mercial credit demander, compliance with the alternative financing theory. （2）Private listed companies with political connections, both in the monetary policy easing or tightening phase, are winners of commer- cial credit, but in the easing phase get much larger than the tightening phase. Further analysis found that political relations and commercial credit is positive correlation during easing phase, while tightening phase changed to negative. （3）We think that it is the political connections bringing ＂Loans Effect＂ and ＂Competitive Advantage＂ caused the different commercial credit strategies of two types of enterprises.