中文摘要：

以中国的投资者保护为研究出发点,本文搜集沪深两市挂牌交易的由自然人创立并拥有的民营公司研究样本,实证检验其两权分离程度、内部制衡机制与公司经营绩效之间的关系。研究发现,在民营公司内部,控制权和所有权的分离对公司的经营绩效产生了显著的负面影响,两权分离程度越大,对公司经营绩效的负面作用越大;其次,内部制衡机制与公司经营绩效显著正相关,制衡机制越强,抑制终极控股股东的侵占行为的效果越显著;最后,两权分离程度与内部制衡机制之间存在着交互作用,在两权分离程度相同的情况下,制衡机制的程度越强,对于减少终极控股股东与中小投资者之间的委托代理成本,改善公司经营绩效的效果越明显。

英文摘要：

To investigate investors＇ protection in China,we hand collect a sample of original private-owned listed companies that established,owned and operated by individuals.With this precious sample,we investigate the relationships among ownership-control rights divergence,outside block holders ownership and operating performance.The conclusion shows that there is a linear relationship between operating performance and ownership-control rights divergence： the greater the divergence,the poorer performance of a company.The outsider block holders＇ ownership count balance mechanism can significantly prevent ultimate controller from expropriate outside investors：the better ownership count balance mechanism,the less principle-agent costs,and the better operating performance.At last,there is an intersection between ownership count balance mechanism and the divergence of ownership and control rights of the ultimate controller.Given the same extent of divergence of ownership and control rights of the ultimate controller,the stronger ownership count balance mechanism can alleviate the principle-agent problem,decrease the ultimate controller＇s expropriation and improve the operating performance.