以我国上市公司2003~2008年的数据为样本,实证检验了上市公司终极控制特征对现金持有水平及其市场价值的影响。研究结果发现:(1)终极控制人性质为国有的上市公司的现金持有比例显著低于民营上市公司;(2)终极控制人性质为国有的上市公司多数不存在控制权与现金流权分离的现象,终极控制特征并不显著影响上市公司的现金持有水平;(3)民营上市公司中普遍存在控制权与现金流权分离的现象,并且分离度越大,公司持有的现金比例越低;(4)在终极控制权与现金流权分离的情况下,提高现金持有水平将降低股票横截面收益,说明终极控制权与现金流权分离降低了上市公司持有的现金的市场价值,但多元回归系数并未通过显著性检验,需待未来做进一步的探讨。研究结果为公司现金持有行为的代理理论提供了证据。
Using a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2008,this paper examines how characteristics of ultimate control affect the level and value of cash holdings.The authors find that state-owned enterprises hold much more cash than private enterprises'.The divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has no effect on cash holdings in SOEs.But the greater divergence wides,the less cash hold by the private company.As the divergence widens,cash holdings has negative effect on the cross-section of stock returns.But the ratio of interaction term is not significantly related to the the cross-section of stock returns.The results of this study provide evidences for agency theory of corporate cash holdings.