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中文摘要：
群体行为演化模拟表明，群体中失信者的存在会导致所有成员的失信。从博弈论的角度看，如果不存在相关机制，或者即使存在但没有起到应有的作用，那么失信会成为每个人的占优策略，这具有必然性。引入相应机制如奖惩机制等，改变原有博弈结构，使守信成为博弈的唯一纳什均衡，使守信成为每个人的优势策略，社会信用将会全面形成。
英文摘要：
Group behavior evolution simulations suggest that the existence of one person with failure in trust in a group would lead to all members to be in failure. From the perspective of game theory, if there is no correlation mechanism, or even there is, but it has not exerted the role into due play, it is inevitable that failure in trust will become the dominant strategy for each person. It＇ s necessary to introduce the appropriate mechanisms, such as re- ward and punishment mechanism, to change the original game structure, to have trustworthiness to be the only Nash equilibrium of the game, to make trustworthiness to be the dominant strategy for each person, and hence the social credit will be fully formed.
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