中文摘要：

本文应用微分对策理论研究区域经济发展过程中战略性新兴产业、传统产业与政府的合作策略及成本分担问题．构建三方动态博弈模型，基于Hamilton—Jacobi—Bellman方程分别求得非合作模式、政府扶持模式、协同合作模式三种情形下的最优努力策略、产业技术水平和最优收益．比较发现：战略性新兴产业、传统产业与地方政府的努力程度与效益影响系数、技术水平影响系数正相关，与成本系数负相关；从产业技术水平和综合效益的角度看，协同合作模式优于非合作模式和政府扶持模式．同时，本文量化分析了政企努力程度和产业技术水平，与效益分配比例和政府补贴比例的关系．补贴因子作为一种有效的调节机制，能够促使战略性新兴产业、传统产业和地方政府共同努力，带动区域社会经济发展．

英文摘要：

A differential game model is established to investigate the cooperation and cost-sharing problems among strategic emerging industries, traditional industries and the government in the regional development economic. With the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equitation, the optimal strategies, the benefits and industrial technical levels are obtained in the conditions of Nash non-cooperative game, Stackelberg leader-follower game and coordinated cooperation game. It can be concluded that the effort level of the government and industries is positively related to their comprehensive benefits and technical level, while it＇s negative correlation to the cost coefficient. Considering from the overall benefit and industrial technology, the cooperation among strategic emerging industries, traditional industries and the government is better than the non-cooperative and government supporting model. Furthermore, it＇s quantitatively analyzed that the relationship among the income distribution, the government subsidy, the effort of the government and enterprises and the development of emergency industry. As an effective regulatory mechanism among the government and industries, the subsidy factor can promote the regional social and economic development.