中文摘要：

源于“理性”和“自利”假设的业绩报酬低敏感性困惑问题．在“过度自信”心理偏差和“公平心理”偏好对传统委托代理分析框架拓展为行为委托代理分析框架下可以获得很好的解释。在这种理念指导下，从公平偏好角度寻求对业绩报酬低敏感性困惑的解释：首先借鉴实验探究了公平偏好特征，根据这些特征模拟刻画了融入公平偏好的心理效用权值函数，解决公平偏好与为委托代理分析框架数理兼容问题；然后把该权值函数植入到经理人的效用函数中，获得业绩报酬契约的最优风险分担水平和努力的解析式，利用该解析式探究分享系数与努力之间关系，他们之间的非线性关系对业绩一报酬低敏感性可以做出合理解释。

英文摘要：

In this paper the problem of low sensitivity paradox of performance-pay derived from ＂ rational＂ and ＂ self-concern＂ assumptions can be well explained under the analytical framework of behavioral principal-agent evolved from the analytical framework of traditional principal-agent by ＂over-confidence＂ and ＂equity preference＂. With this idea, this paper explains the low sensitivity paradox of performance-pay from the point of equity preference： Firstly, the characteristics of equity preference are explored with reference to the experiments, and a weight function into which equity preference is integrated is simulated according to these characteristics. Secondly, the relationship between optimal risk sharing level and effort of performance-pay is disclosed by implanting weight function into utility function of operator. Finally, this paper offers reasonable explanation to low sensitivity paradox of performance-pay.