中文摘要：

实验经济学发现可控博彝实验均衡与标准予博弈精炼均衡预言相违背，实验经济学家把违背归结为参与者行为对“自私自利假设”的系统偏离，因此提出了诸如非公平规避、基于公平意图的互惠等非自私自利的公平偏好模型来解释这种系统偏离。对这些问题的厘清有利于公平偏好统一分析框架构建、拓展其在现实生活中特别是激励契约中的应用。

英文摘要：

Experimental economics discovers that the equilibrium of controllable game experiment violates the prediction of the standard sub-game＇s refine equilibrium. The experi- mental economists sum up the violation as the systemic deviation of the actors towards the ＂self-concern assumption＂. Thus they propose some social preference models of non self-concern to explain this deviation, such as inequity averse, reciprocity based on the fair intention, quasi-maximin preferences and the altruism. The understanding toward these questions can be beneficial for the fairness preference to have unified analysis frame and enlarge the use in the real life, especially in the application of the incentive contract.