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中文摘要：
作为一种局中人结盟形式，层次结构比联盟结构更具一般性．本文致力于给出带层次结构效用可转移合作对策的多步Shapley值，具体给出了其分配过程及公理化刻画．另外，作为一个等价分配过程，本文还证明了它等价于一个特殊效用可转移合作对策的加权Shapley值．研究结果扩展了带联盟结构效用可转移合作对策的两步Shapley值，可为研究其它带结盟限制合作对策的解提供借鉴．
英文摘要：
As an alliance form for players, a level structure is more general than a coalition structure. This paper devotes to propose the multi-step Shapley value of transferable utility cooperative games with a level structure. Concretely, an allocation procedure and an axiomatic characterization of it are given. Additionally, as an equivalent allocation procedure, this paper proves that it is identical with the weighted Shapley value of an appropriate transferable utility cooperative game. Research results extend the two- step Shapley value of transferable utility cooperative games with a coalition structure, and they can be taken as references to investigate other solutions of transferable utility cooperative gaines with an alliance restriction.
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