中文摘要：

在不同的生命周期阶段，公司往往会表现出差异化的治理特征，因此债权人设计有针对性的动态治理机制对于实现区域金融稳定和公司治理均衡显得尤为重要。文章基于动态能力理论，利用上市公司面板数据，通过对企业生命周期进行系统划分，探讨了不同企业生命周期阶段中债权人短期及长期借款对代理成本的动态影响。研究发现，上市公司代理成本在生命周期内具有显著的波动特征；债权人短期借款对代理成本具有动态抑制作用，并且对衰退期代理成本的抑制效应最强；而长期借款能够促进代理成本的提高，且促进效应具有边际递增的特征。

英文摘要：

Since corporations show heterogeneous features when progressing in life cycle, it＇ s been crucial for creditors to build dynamic governance mechanism not only for the safety operation of regional finance, but for the governance balance for the corporations. Based on corporations＇ dynamic capabilities theory, after separating different phases of life cycle by using China＇ s private list corporations＇ data, this paper analyzes the creditors＇ dynamic influence upon agency cost in every phase of their life cycle. It is found out that agency cost shows a ＂vibration＂ phenomenon as corporations proceed in their life cycles, and the ones in mature phase have the highest agency cost level. Short-term debt from creditors has shown dynamic governance effect towards agency cost, while long-term debt can amplify the agency cost. Both dynamic governance and amplifying effect increase marginally when the corporations proceed in their life-cycles.