中文摘要：

高管激励契约对技术创新的显著影响受到理论界与实践界的普遍关注，但以往研究多以显性激励为主。控制权激励作为一种重要的高管隐性激励契约，在本质上具有双重性．应从非线性视角出发对其与技术创新的关联性进行重新审视。本文基于创新经济学相关理论．运用中国高科技上市公司2007-2010年的平衡面板数据，对高管控制权激励与技术创新动态能力的关联性进行实证检验，结果表明：技术创新动态能力由技术创新投入能力、技术创新产出能力、技术创新转化能力三个维度构成；控制权激励与技术创新动态能力之间存在显著的倒U型关系．即当达到极值之前．控制权激励以积极性为主导从而对技术创新动态能力具有促进效应．但超过此极值．控制权激励的消极性逐渐凸显。转而对技术创新动态能力产生明显的抑制效应。因此．保持适度的控制权激励力度、并对显性激励与隐性激励进行合理配置是提升上市公司技术创新动态能力的理性选择。

英文摘要：

The striking influence that executive incentive contracts exert on technology innovation is concerned by theory and practice fields, but previous studies only focused on explicit incentives. Control rights incentive is an important implicit incentive contract and it is of naturally duality. We should reconsider the relationship between control rights incentive and technology innovation dynamic capability based on the nonlinearity perspective. We adopt the balanced panel data from 2007-2010 of Chinese high-tech listed companies to do the empirical research to find the relationship between the two factors. The result shows that technology-innovation dynamic capability is composed of input capability, output capability and transforming capability. And there is an invested U-shape relationship between control rights incentive and technology-innovation dynamic capability. After the incentive strength increase to a special degree, the dynamic capability begins to decline. Therefore, to maintain moderate control rights incentive and to integrate explicit incentives and implicit incentive are the effective approaches to improving technology-innovation dynamic capability.