以我国上海证券交易所2008~2010年发生并购的405家收购企业为样本,研究并购中CEO薪酬操纵的行为及其价值效应。结果发现:并购中CEO权力和CEO薪酬份额(CPS)均对企业价值具有破坏作用;并购中CEO利用权力提高自身薪酬份额,破坏了企业价值,CEO薪酬份额(CPS)在CEO权力破坏企业价值的过程中起中介作用;股权集中度对CEO权力与CPS的关系具有负向调节作用,表明股权集中度有效抑制了CEO利用权力提高自身CPS的薪酬寻租行为。
This paper analyes the effect of CEO power and CEO pay slice on enterprise value in acquisitions by using 405 ac- quiring firms listed in Shanghai Securities Exchange from 2008 to 2010. The empirical results show a negative relationship be- tween CEO power and enterprise value in acquisitions, further CEO pay slice has significant mediating effects on that relation- ship. It also reveals CEO power plays a significant role in promoting CEO pay slice. Further ownership concentration has sig- nificant moderate effects on that relationship, which weakens the influence of CEO power on CEO pay slice.