研究了由单供应商和单生产商组成、二者产出均为随机且生产商面对随机需求的二级供应链的协调问题,决策变量为供应商的农资投入数量(I)和生产商的原料采购数量(R).针对随机比例产出情形,证明了集中决策下的供应链期望利润为I和R的凹函数.阐释了分散决策下收益共享合同不能协调供应链,并提出能协调供应链的收益和产出风险共享合同.该合同是在收益共享基础上以缺货补偿和余货补偿的形式共担原料产出不确定性风险.理论分析和数值算例说明了合同协调的有效性.算例分析还发现,该合同下生产商期望利润对产出和需求不确定性程度的变化比供应商更为敏感.
The contract-based supply chain (SC) coordination problem of a two-stage SC under random yield and random demand is studied. In the addressed SC, the decision variables of the supplier and the producer are the agricultural input (I) and the order quantity of raw material (R), respectively. The uniqueness of the SC is that both the producer and the supplier are characterized by a random yield. For the random proportional yield, firstly the concavity of the Then, we show that the revenue- expected profit function of the whole SC with respect to I and R is proved. sharing (RS) contract is not able to coordinate the chain. Lastly, a RS and yield risk-sharing contract is presented to coordinate the chain. The proposed contract is based on RS contract and bidirectional compensation for overproduction and shortage of raw material to share the risk of supply un- certainty. The coordination effectiveness of the proposed contract is theoretically proved, and is illustrated by two numerical examples. The results of numerical analysis show that the expected profit of the producer is more sensitive to the change of supply and demand uncertainty than that of the supplier.