中文摘要：

中国的产能过剩问题是在土地要素配置扭曲的基础上形成的，这种扭曲源于政府对土地的垄断供给以及政府在土地出让收入使用过程中的逆市场化行为。其基本逻辑是：政府将土地按照不同用途进行差异化定价，通过非市场化手段压低工业用地价格来招商引资，以增加国民收入和就业机会；通过市场化的手段出让商住用地，获取巨额的土地出让收入进行基础设施建设投资，进一步扩大政绩并为部分产能过剩行业创造一定需求。研究表明：工业用地的价格被地方政府扭曲，这种扭曲是引致企业过度投资、形成产能过剩的重要原因。而以土地出让金为支撑的地方政府基础设施投资则在短期内可能有助于缓解产能过剩。

英文摘要：

The overcapacity problem in China is caused by the distortion of allocation of land el- ement which derives from the government＇ s monopoly of land supply and the inverse market behavior in the use of land-transferring fees. The fundamental logic is that, in order to increase the national income and employment opportunities, the government prices differently in accordance with varying uses of land and invites investments through non-market methods such as lowering industrial land price. At the same time, the government sells the right to use commercial and residential land via market-oriented means, which can collect large amounts of money for infrastructure construction investment. The political achievements will in turn be expanded and create a certain demand in industries which have excess production capacity. The research shows that, the price of industrial land is distorted by local governments, which explains the excessive investment and production capacity behavior. While the local governments supported by land transfer income could help reduce excess capacity in a short time by investing in infrastructure.