中文摘要：

运用股权改革后上市公司的非平衡面板数据,控制内生性影响,从边际分析等多视角对大股东超额控制权、其他股东制衡的同期关系、跨期关系的治理效应进行了检验,实证表明,大股东现金流权增加有利于提高公司的治理效益,股权集中度上升会损害公司效益,股东制衡股增加有利于治理效益的提升,超额控制权的治理效应则不显著。

英文摘要：

This paper uses unbalanced panel data of list companies after the shareholding reform, controlling endogenous intlu- ence, from perspective of marginal analysis, examining ＆ testing the contemporary and intertemporal governance effect of excess-con- trol fights of the major shareholder and the balances of other shareholders. The empirical test shows that it is not significant in the in- crease in cash flow fights of the major shareholder benefit to the effectiveness of the corporate governance, the increase in equity con- centration undermines the effectiveness of the company governance, the increase of shareholders balance benefit governance effective and, the governance effect of excess-control fights.