用2001-2005年4927家中国上市公司作为研究样本,本文检验了公司投资机会和股权结构对财务政策选择的影响。实证结果表明:在控制了公司资产规模和盈利水平下,中国上市公司的资本结构和股利政策与其投资机会显著负相关,与股权集中度正相关;公司对高级管理者的现金补偿与投资机会正相关,与股权集中度负相关。同时,有证据表明,少数大股东联盟可以有效降低公司代理成本。
Based on the statistics form 4927 sample listed companies in China from 2001-2005, this paper examines the correlation between the growth opportunities, shareholder structure and corporate finance policies choice. Results show that there is asignificant negative correlation between investment opportunities and levels of both debt-to-equity ratios and divi- dend yields; that there is a significant positive correlation between the share concentration and levels of both debt financing and dividend yields after controlling for firm size and profitability; and that the cash compensation that corporate offers to the top executives positivele correclates with investment opportunity, and negatively correlates with ownership concentration. Finally, we conclued that leagues of minor blockhloders can effectively mitigate agency costs.