中文摘要：

以2003—2014年间国有上市公司为研究对象,对冗员的重要经济后果进行了实证检验。研究发现,冗员不仅会加大国有企业的自由现金约束及国企高管的道德风险,还具有显著的投资约束作用。进一步研究得出,适度冗员和过度冗员具有不同的经济后果和治理后果,适度冗员会增强对国企高管的负激励,提升高管的投资动力,而随着冗员的持续增加,自由现金流约束作用和道德风险强化效应则会降低企业的投资规模。同时,冗员与投资效率的关系也进一步佐证了适度冗员的治理作用,适度冗员会降低国企的过度投资水平,而存在过度冗员现象的企业其过度投资也更严重。另外,冗员与投资规模之间的关系仅在公益类国企显著,在商业类国企中并不存在显著的负相关关系;冗员对企业投资的约束作用也仅存在于地方国企,而在中央国企则缺乏此约束作用的证据。外部环境变量,如产品市场竞争程度、企业所在地的GDP增长率和企业所在地的财政赤字率,对冗员与企业投资行为之间的关系没有影响。

英文摘要：

Based on the data of the state-owned listed companies during the years from 2003 to 2014, this paper makes an emperical test for the economic consequences of redundancies. The research indicates that the redundancies will not only influence the free cash flow of state-owned enterprises （SOEs） and moral hazard of executives in SOEs, but also has a significant constraint role in investment. Further study finds that moderate redundancies and excessive redundancies can lead to different economic consequences and governance consequences. Moderate redundancies will enhance the negative incentives to the executives of SOEs, and enhance the executives＇ investment motivation. However, as redundancies keep increasing, free cash flow constraints and moral hazard strengthening effect will reduce the investment scale of the enterprises. At the same time, the relationship between redundancies and investment efficiency is the further evidence for the governance role of moderate redundancies. Moderate redundancies will reduce the level of excessive investment in SOEs, and enterprises with excessive redundancies would invest much more. Moreover, there is a significant negative relationship between investment scale and redundancies in the public interest SOEs but there is no such significant negative relationship found in the business SOEs. The constraint effect that redundancies have on corporate investment only exists in local SOEs while there is no such constraint evidence in the central SOEs. The external environment variables, such as the degree of product market competition, the GDP growth rate and the financial def-icit rate of enterprise location, have no effect on the relationship between redundancies and corporate investment behaviors.