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中文摘要：
在电力市场中发电商利用其寡头垄断地位施行市场力以谋取超额利润,但零售商与发电商之间的远期合约可以抑制这种市场力.在两个零售商与两个发电商的电力市场中,运用博弈论,建立了零售商之间竞争发电商合约的签约博弈模型和领导者-随从博弈模型,分析了在现货市场前的合约市场中零售商主动采取合约竞标策略,提供经济激励,鼓励发电商进入合约市场,并解释了＂当发电商具有市场力时,远期价格高于现货市场价格＂的现象,证明了零售商这种主动合约策略行为能够实现社会福利最大化.
英文摘要：
Generators in a wholesale electricity market can exercise market power to get surplus profits, but the existence of forward contracts between consumers and generators mitigates this market power. In an electricity market with two retailers and two generators, Game Theory and leader-follower models were used to model the contracting game between retailers. The retailers can strategically offer an economic incentive to the generators to enter into such contracts market before a spot electricity market. And it has been explained why there is a phenomenon in which the forward contract price is higher than the spot market when generators exercise market power. With these contracts, these analyses have shown that social welfare is maximized when retailers can offer strategically forward contracts.
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