中文摘要：

从对公共利益、公众参与、公平补偿的强调来看,《国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例》相比《城市房屋拆迁管理条例》进步显著。然而,引入经济学中博弈论概念工具对该征收条例的解读表明,公平补偿能否实现在很大程度上取决于评估机构。该征收条例中一些模糊的规定,以及《国有土地上房屋征收评估办法》赋予评估机构以垄断地位的制度设计,为政府和评估机构的机会主义行为留下了极大的空间。由此,构建有效的第三方评估市场,并在政府报价之后赋予被征收人以真正的自由选择评估机构的权利,是构建法治社会中和谐的征收关系的关键。

英文摘要：

Comparing with the Regulations on Administration of the Housing Demolition and Relo- cation in Cities, the Regulations for the Expropriation of and Compensation for Housing on State --owned Land （Regulations for Expropriation） has made significant progress. The new regula- tion＇s emphasis on public interest, public participation as well as fair compensation sent a positive signal illustrating the progress of rule of law in China. By using the analytical instrument of in- centive compatibility and game theory, this paper conducts an analysis of the Regulations for Ex- propriation and finds that the appraisal agency plays a critical part in the process. However, cer- tain parts of the Regulations for Expropriation are vague and the Measures for Real Estate Ap- praisal in Expropriation of Houses on State--owned Land （Measures for Appraisal） give the ap- praisal agency a monopolistic position. These will leave significant room for local governments and appraisal agencies to adopt opportunistic behaviors. This paper conducts an analysis of a few typi- cal cases as well as 64 regulations drafted by local governments in following the Regulations for Expropriation and the Measures for Appraisal, including 49 local regulations for expropriation and 15 local regulations for appraisal agencies. The analysis supports our findings. This paper concludes that establishing an efficient third--party market of appraisal agencies and providing the expropriated persons with a right to choose the appraisal agency is one of the crucial parts for con- structing a harmonious government--expropriated person relationship in a society of rule of law.