中文摘要：

文章以国美电器“控制权之争”为背景，采用案例研究方法剖析了家族企业治理转型过程中因创业家族控制权让渡而引发的控制权私利及其诱发机理，并进一步构建模型揭示了投资者权益司法保护制度和经理人诚信与声誉机制两类制度因素对经理人控制权私利行动和创始家族控制权让渡决策的影响效应。研究表明，无论是权益司法保护，还是市场声誉机制都对经理人控制权私利行动产生显著约束，进而对创始家族控制权让渡和家族企业治理转型进程产生影响，即司法保护制度和经理人市场越发达，创始家族向职业经理人让渡的企业控制权越多，家族企业治理转型进程越顺利。

英文摘要：

Based on the control conflict of GOME Electrical Appliances Holding Ltd, this paper analyzes private benefits of control in the transfer of control in family firms, and then builds a model to investigate the effect of investor＇s legal protection system and managerial trust ＆ reputation mechanism on managerial private benefits of control and transferring of control. The research indi- cates that, both the formal constraint from investor＇s legal protection system and informal constraint from market reputation exert great influence on managerial private benefits of control. That is to say, with the advancement of investor＇s legal protection and profession- al market, the founding family tends to transfer much more control rights to professional managers, which will improve the govern- ance transition of family firms.