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中文摘要：
高管薪酬水平的不断上涨催生了政府的＂限薪令＂,但它能产生预期的效果吗？本文基于不完全契约理论的分析指出,现实中的高管激励契约是正式契约和关系契约的结合;基于这种认识,本文用一个高管收益最大化的动态模型,分析了正式契约和关系契约同时作用的内在机理和影响因素,结论显示,目前的＂限薪令＂只限制了高管通过正式契约获得的薪酬,而没有约束到关系契约薪酬,因此其作用是有限的。
英文摘要：
Tremendous increase of executive pay forced the implementation of government-imposed executive pay curbs, but do they work？ Based on incomplete contract theory, this paper points out that incentive contract of executives can be seen as a combination of relational contract and formal contract. From this new view, a mathematical dynamic model based on maximization of executive benefit is put forward to analyze the factors and mechanism of using both two types of incentive contracts together. The results show that, in practice, the effect of government-imposed executive pay curbs will be limited since they only constrain the compensation executives get through formal incentive contract.
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The determinants of peasants' family income in China 's west underdeveloped area: effects of working
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