中文摘要：

以“一个物流服务集成商一两个功能型物流服务提供商”构成的二级物流服务供应链为研究对象，利用博弈论的理论方法建立了Stackelberg博弈模型，研究功能型物流服务提供商的供应链契约选择问题。该模型假定物流服务集成商占主导地位，其决策变量为物流服务的市场价格。而作为从者的功能型物流服务提供商，需要在收益共享契约和批发价格契约间作出决策，并确定相应的契约参数，以吸引物流服务集成商更多的物流能力订购量。研究结果表明：在物流服务集成商占主导地位的物流服务供应链中，两个功能型物流服务提供商选择相同的策略，或低成本FLSP选择批发价格契约而高成本FLSP选择收益共享契约。无论采取以上哪种均衡策略组合，物流服务集成商、功能型物流服务提供商的利润并无差别，因而，对于由物流服务集成商主导的物流服务供应链来说，收益共享契约的协调作用与批发价格契约的协调作用相同。

英文摘要：

The two-stage logistics service supply chain with one logistics service integrator and two functional logistics service providers is considered. The decision-making process of the two actors in the logistics service supply chain is modeled as a Stackelberg leader - follower game model and the supply chain contract choice problem of the functional logistics service providers is analyzed. In the Stackelberg game, logistics service integrator as the leader determines logistics service price, each functional logistics service providers as the follower chooses either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the logistics service integrator, and determines the contract parameters, to obtain higher division ratio of the logistics capacity from the logistics service integrator. The results show that： in the two-stage logistics service supply chain dominated by the logistics service integrator, the equilibrium is achieved when： 1） two functional logistics service providers choose the same contract, or 2） the functional service provider with lower cost chooses the wholesale price contract and another chooses the revenue-sharing contract. No matter which Nash equilibrium strategy is adopted, the logistics service integrator and the functional logistics service providers obtain the same profit. So, the revenue sharing mechanism does not outperform than the wholesale price mechanism.