中文摘要：

当前创业板上市公司内部治理结构形式的＂完美＂与现实中凸显的治理诟病,表明借鉴英美等股权分散为特征的成熟上市企业的治理规范和标准,对于具有强家族治理特征的中国创业企业并不见得一定适用。首先,从第一重委托代理关系中高管代理人的机会主义道德风险与第二重委托代理关系中的大股东侵占利益道德风险两个方面,分析了现阶段关于两类委托代理问题治理的研究进展,指出了当前研究缺少关注创业企业治理特殊情境的不足。其次,基于双重委托代理框架构建了创业企业治理框架,提出在第一重委托代理关系中,从代理人激励视角分析创始高管在创业企业股权安排对创业企业治理的影响,在第二重委托代理关系中,分析大股东委托人在合理控制权私有收益下所发挥的＂监督效应＂大于＂侵占效应＂的最佳股权安排,在双重委托代理关系下,分析创业企业不同股权身份制衡度对企业治理的影响路径,并充分考虑外部市场化程度、行业竞争差异以及企业规模等管理情境,以上研究成果将为提高创业上市公司内部治理水平提供理论指导。

英文摘要：

The＂perfect＂internal governance structure of current companies listed on GEM and the imperfect reality indicate that drawing lessons from the governance norms and standards of Anglo-American listed corporate,which are characterized by equity dispersion,does not necessarily apply to the entrepreneurial enterprises in China,which has strong family governance characteristics.First,from the two aspects of opportunistic moral hazard of executive agents in the principal-agent relationship,and the moral risk of encroaching on the interests by big shareholders of the second agent relations,the paper analyzes the present research progress about the two kinds of principal-agent problems of governance,and points out the lack of current research on special situation of entrepreneurial corporate governance.Secondly,based on the dual-agent framework,it builds the framework of corporate governance,and puts forward that,in the first agent relationship,the influence of founding executives＇ equity arrangements on starting-up corporate governance should be analyzed from the perspective of the agent incentive;in the second agent relationship,the optimal equity arrangement made by large shareholders under the reasonable control of the private benefits is analyzed,i.e.,＂supervising effect＂is bigger than＂encroaching effect＂;Under the double agent relationship,the path of influence of checks and balances of different ownership identity in the corporate on the entrepreneurial enterprises＇ governance is analyzed,and management situations,such as external marketization degree,the difference of industry competition and enterprise scales are given full consideration.The above research results will provide theoretical guidance the improvement of internal governance of listed companies.