以2009—2011年创业板上市公司为样本,探讨了创业企业IPO后的董事会结构对企业研发资源投入的影响.结果显示,创业企业IPO后创始高管团队控制董事会程度与企业研发资源投入正相关,创始高管团队持股比例及股权分散程度与企业研发资源投入的关系亦是如此;进一步发现创始高管团队持股比例与股权分散程度的交互作用加强了对企业研发投入强度的影响,而在创始高管团队控制董事会程度、创始高管团队持股比例与股权分散程度的三重交互作用中,创始高管团队控制董事会程度与持股股权分散程度之间存在互补作用,与其持股比例之间存在替代作用;研究还揭示外部专家型董事而不是外部监管型董事对企业研发资源投入更为关注.研究结论从董事会结构进化论的视角,为创业企业优化IPO治理结构、促进企业研发资源投入方面提供了具体的理论指导.
It investigated the influence of post-lPO board composition on R&D resource investment of entrepreneurial firms using the samples of listed companies on the growth enterprise market from 2009 to 2011. The result indicates that after the IPO of entrepreneurial firms, the presence of the original TMT in the board positively impacts the firm' s R&D resource investment, and so do the shareholding ratio and ownership dispersion degree of original TMT. Further study shows that the interaction of the shareholding ratio and the ownership dispersion degree of original TMT strengthens their influence on firm' s R&D resource investment. Moreover, in the interaction of the presence of the original TMT in the board, the shareholding ratio and ownership dispersion degree, the complementary effect which derives from the pres- ence of the original TMT in the board and the ownership dispersion degree as well as the substitution effect that results from the presence of the original TMT in the board and the shareholding ratio of original TMT are also analyzed. Mean- while, it asserts that it' s the specialistic outside director rather than regulatory outside director that pays more attention to firm' s R&D resource investment. The findings provide theoretical guidance for entrepreneurial firms to optimize IPO governance structure so as to enhance firm' s R&D resource investment from the perspective of board composition evolu- tion theory.