多任务情景下国企高管盈余管理行为具有一定的特殊性。通过对现有文献的梳理,在分析国企承担的多项任务特点的基础上,探讨了多任务偏重变化对国企高管盈余管理行为的影响。认为国企高管为了满足企业或个人私利会产生盈余管理动机并引发盈余管理行为,外部政策法规的变化将加剧盈余管理行为,不同类型机构投资者的入股也会对盈余管理行为产生影响。现有国企多任务对高管盈余管理行为的研究由于选取的企业范围、数据时间和盈余管理计量模型不同,在影响方向及程度得出的研究结论未能统一。未来研究可以引入国企类型和高管行为偏好,改进盈余管理综合计量模型,深入探讨国企控股权变化引发的多任务偏重改变与交互对高管盈余管理行为的影响机理。
The earnings management behavior of State-owned enterprises' executives has a certain particularity under the multi-task situation.This study first generalizes the existing literature,then,on the basis of analyzing the various tasks of the state-owned enterprises,discusses the influence of the change of multi-task's particular stress on the earnings management behavior of their managers.It is believed that in order to satisfy the enterprise or individual interests,the earnings management motivation will be produced which will cause earnings management behavior.The change of the external policies and regulations will increase the earnings management behavior and shares of different types of institutional investors will also have an impact on that.According to the conclusions of existing research of earnings management from the multitask perspective,the effect direction and degree are different due to the enterprise scope,data time and earnings management model.Future research can discuss the influence of multitasks' interaction on management behavior of the managers of state-owned enterprises by introducing different types of state-owned enterprises and the preference of executive behavior and improving the comprehensive measurement model of earnings management.