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中文摘要：
以2008-2013年上市并购公司和非并购公司为样本,实证检验家族公司并购对CEO薪酬和CEO变更的影响。结果表明：家族公司并购对CEO薪酬无显著影响,非家族公司并购与CEO薪酬显著正相关;非家族公司并购降低了CEO变更的可能性,家族公司并购对CEO变更无显著影响。这说明,家族公司在并购中的代理问题相对非家族公司较小,家族控股股东对管理层的监督机制能够减轻所有权与控制权分离所产生的第一类代理问题。
英文摘要：
This paper investigates the impact of corporate acquisition on CE 0 compensation and CE 0 turnover of family firms.We find that CEOs in family firms do not experience an increase in their compensation during the post-acquisition period,while there is a positive and statistically significant association between the compensation of CEOs in non-family firms and their acquisition activity.This finding is consistent with the view that the supervision mechanism of the family controlIing family shareholders fa management can mitigate the problem of the first kind of agency that arises from the separation of ownership and control.Further,we find that likelihood of CEO turnover declines following an acquisition in non-family firms,suggesting that these acquiring CEOs do not face a higher likelihood of dismissal while they receive a higher level of compensation.In contrast,there is no significant impact of acquisitions on CEO turnover in family firms.
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