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中文摘要：
近年来，公司治理方面的研究从股权高度分散条件下管理者与外部股东之间的委托代理关系，转向大股东掌握集中股权而引发的掏空与利益输送行为。本文立足于我国现状，从大股东自利动机切入，研究存在大股东利益输送的关联并购事件，探究大股东利益输送行为是否存在。实证分析表明，对绩效较差的公司实施的关联并购确是大股东的一种利益输送行为，且使用财务绩效与市场绩效衡量作用时间长短存在差异。
英文摘要：
The study of corporate governance once focused on the agency relationship between the manage- ment and outside shareholders, however, given the centralized proprietorship, conflicts of interest between large shareholder and minority stockholders start to attract more attention recently. On the basis situation of our country＇ s, this thesis takes large shareholders＇ motivation of related M＆As and the lack of law and supervision as breakthrough point, and the M＆A events with propping motivation as object of this study. And explores the exsistence of propping. The empirical results show that： the related M＆As undergone by companies performing poor is indeed a means of propping; however, the measurement of market reaction and financial performance differ in duration of influence.
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