本文利用2007~2011年问沪、深两市公开发行的公司债数据,分析产权性质和信息质量对公司债券初始定价的影响。研究发现:国有产权能够发挥隐性担保作用,通过直接和间接作用路径降低投资者面临的违约风险,从而使公司债券获得较低的信用利差;上市公司自愿披露正面内部控制鉴证报告能够向外界释放高信息质量的积极信号,降低投资者面临的信息风险,从而使公司债券获得较低的信用利差,但这种作用在国有上市公司中却不显著,说明政府的隐陛担保可能会使投资者忽视对上市公司信息质量的必要关注,存在诱发道德风险的可能。这些发现有利于深入剖析我国公司债定价存在的深层次问题,从而推动公司债券市场的改革与发展。
Utilizing data of corporate bonds issued publicly by the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, this paper studies the effect of ownership type and information quality on initial pricing of cor- porate bonds in China. It is found that state -owned ownership burdens implicit guarantee, which could lower the credit spread of corporate bonds significantly by direct and indirect paths to default risk. While listed com- panies voluntarily disclose the positive internal control assurance reports can play a signal function to the public about higher information quality. Investors will give a higher price of corporate bonds issued by these listed companies, because of fl, e lower information risk, but this is not significant in the sample of state - owned listed companies, which maybe mean that governments' implicit guarantee make investors ignore the necessary atten- tion to information quality of listed companies, inducing moral hazard. These findings are useful for deepening the analysis on 13rofound issues in comorate bond market nricin~, and will nromote its reform nnd d~w, lnnm~nt