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中文摘要：
本文以契约理论为基础研究了信息透明度对信贷契约以及不同期限信贷契约治理效应的影响。研究发现，信贷契约和不同期限的契约都能够抑制管理者在职消费的代理成本，长期贷款契约的抑制作用更大。在提高公司绩效方面，信贷契约和短期信贷契约都显著降低公司绩效，长期信贷契约能够显著提高公司绩效。信息透明度能够改善信贷契约的治理效应：信息透明度能够降低信贷契约和短期信贷契约对公司绩效的侵蚀作用，信息透明度能够显著增加信贷契约和长期信贷契约对管理者在职消费的抑制作用。
英文摘要：
This paper studies how the transparency of information affects the credit contract and different term loan contract gov- ernance effect based on the Contract Theory. We find that both the credit contract and different term contracts can inhibit man- agers on-the-job consumption agency cost. And the effect of the long-term loan contract is stronger. Both the credit contract and the short-term loan contract can decrease the corporate performance significantly, while the long-term loan contract can im- prove the corporate performance significantly. Besides, information transparency can improve the credit contract governance ef- fect significantly. That is, information transparency can reduce the erosion effect of the credit contract and the short-term loan contract on the corporate performance. Also, information transparency can increase the inhibition effect of the credit contract and the long-term loan contract on the manager on-the-job consumption significantly.
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