以我国2010~2014年1354家上市公司发起的2034起并购事件为样本,研究了主并公司CEO股权激励对并购决策的影响。研究发现:上市公司CEO股权激励强度越大,越容易发起并购;上市公司风险不确定性增大了CEO股权激励与并购决策正相关性;股权激励强度对并购决策这种正的影响仅限于非过度自信的CEO,对过度自信的CEO的影响并不显著;董事会作为公司治理的核心机制,显著影响CEO股权激励与并购决策之间的关系;CEO激励强度对并购短期绩效并无显著影响。
Using equity merger transactions of the Listed Companies from 2010 to 2014, this paper examines the effect of equity based incentives on acquisition investments by Logit model, results show that the intensity of executive stock incentives significantly increase the acquisition possibility; we also examine the effect of uncertainty, CEO overconfidence and the role of board structure on the relationship between CEO equity based incentives and acquisition decisions. Finally we find that the uncertainty significantly positively affects the relation of CEO equity based incentives and acquisition investments; importantly, the positive relation between equity based incentive and acquisitions just confined only to non-overconfident CEO subgroup; the board structure significantly affects the association between equity based incentives and acquisition decisions. In the end, we also examine whether CEO equity based incentives lead to larger bidding firm announcement returns, the result show that CEO equity based incentives not generally affect bidder announcement returns.