欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
本文提出企业治理结构选择的理论模型，比较了民主与集权两种治理结构对于公司业绩的影响，认为治理结构的选择依赖于公司生命周期的发展阶段。在创业阶段，集权的治理结构更有效率，但要求兼作经理人的创业者有充足的资金。若资金不足，由于经理人控制权寻租和小股东投票权损失，公司面临较高的融资成本，作为补偿，要求经理人的商业能力要显著高于经理人市场的平均水平，即经理人能力同自有资金在一定程度上可相互替代。本文还应用指数化期权定价方法给出了小股东投票权损失估值，结果表明，经理人市场平均商业能力提高越快，投票权损失越大。
英文摘要：
We present a theoretical model of founder＇s choice between democracy and au- tocracy in corporate governance. At the startup period, the choice of autocracy is more effi- cient though it requires more initial capital. If external finance is needed, the founder would hear higher capital cost due to manager＇s rent-seeking and the loss of voting right of minority share- holders. We show that founder＇s own capitals and his managerial skills are substitutes. The results show that the higher the level of managerial skills, the more losses in voting right.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
Simulation of exit choosing in pedestrian evacuation with consideration of the direction visual fiel
A new model for studying the SO-based pre-trip information release strategy and route choice behavio
A cellular automaton model of traffic considering the dynamic evolution of velocity randomization pr
Continuum modeling of park-and-ride services in a linear monocentric city with deterministic mode ch
Route choice in pedestrian evacuation under conditions of good and zero visibility: Experimental and
Modelling heterogeneous drivers; responses to route guidance and parking information systems in stoc
Study and Application of Credit Scoring Models to Appraisal of the Loan to Chinese Companies with Un
期刊信息
位置：