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中文摘要：
借助微分博弈研究由单个制造商与两个零售商组成的供应链系统中长期联合减排和低碳宣传的问题.在消费者需求受产品减排量和零售商低碳宣传努力影响的情况下,构建了3种微分博弈模型.研究发现,在一定条件下,成本分担契约可以实现制造商和零售商利润的Pareto改善,而且处于稳定状态时,随着竞争强度的增加,制造商和整个供应链系统的利润逐渐上升,零售商的利润逐渐下降.最后,通过算例对模型进行了分析.
英文摘要：
With the aid of differential game, the long-term joint emission reductions and low-carbon promotion problems of the supply chain system consisted of a single manufacturer and two retailers are studied. In the case that the consumer demand is affected by emission reductions of products and the retailers＇ low-carbon promotion, three differential game models are constructed. It is found that the cost-sharing contract can achieve Pareto improvement of manufacturers＇ and retailers＇ profits under certain conditions. With the increase of competition, the profits of the manufacturer and supply chain system increase while the retailers＇ profits decrease. Finally, the model is analyzed through an example.
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