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中文摘要：
研究某创新型产品在市场需求随机波动下的运输与库存最优控制策略和多节点库存运输的网络协调。首先以布朗运动描述市场随机累计需求,在满足高服务水平（保证无缺货）的同时考虑常规和紧急两种运输方式及库存补货策略,证明和求解出该产品的单节点和多节点最优库存瞬时控制策略,使得系统长期平均运营成本最小化。采用数值分析和仿真揭示了最优控制策略下单分销商和多分销商系统的运营绩效与各参数之间的变化趋势和敏感性,发现多分销商集中决策相对于分散决策不一定能带来更低的运营成本。以清晰联盟博弈刻画和证明了在补货流和需求流平衡时多分销商分散决策演化为集中运营联合控制后能更有效地协调供应链、降低运营成本,分别证明求解了单产品和多产品情况下清晰联盟博弈核的存在性及其条件,最后给出比例法则和扩充Shapley值两种总体单调分配方案作为该清晰联盟博弈成本分摊的合理预测,并解释了两者差异性的来源。
英文摘要：
Under the market demand fluctuation,the network coordination of the innovative product＇s transportation and inventory optimal control strategy with multi-nodes inventory transportation were researched.Brownian motion was used to describe the accumulation of market demand,which satisfied the high service level at the same time considered the regular and emergent shipment.The optimal inventory immediate control strategy of single node and multiple nodes were proved and solved,which made the long average cost of system was minimum.Both numerical analysis and simulation were exploited to reveal the operational performance of single distributor and multi-distributors＇ system and the changing trend of parameters,and the result showed that the operating cost of multi-distributors＇ centralized decision making was not lower than decentralized decision making.The crisp coalition game model was used to prove that the decentralized decision making of multi-distributors could coordinate supply chain effectively after change into centralized control in equilibrium with replenishment flow and demand flow.The existences as well as its existing conditions of crisp coalition game were solved.Two population monotonic allocation schemes of proportional rules and extended Shapely value were given as reasonable prediction of the cost allocation in the coalition to illustrate the source of differences between these two solutions.
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